SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: REFINING THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS ANALYSIS
†

LINDA SILBERMAN

To be objective about the role of conflict of laws in the treatment
of same-sex marriage, it is helpful to start with tolerance for the views
of both sides in the substantive debate over whether to permit samesex marriage. I begin with this observation because much of the writing about conflict of laws issues and the recognition of same-sex mar1
riage is far from neutral on that issue. Unless and until the Supreme
Court determines that a prohibition on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional as a matter of federal law, it is within the prerogative of each
individual state to determine what status to accord to same-sex couples
who want to formalize their relationship and/or what rights should
attach to such relationships. The view about same-sex marriage that is
taken by a particular state (in the United States) or by a particular
country reflects the set of values accepted in that community as determined through its own political processes, whether expressed in
state constitutional amendments, statutes enacted by the legislature,
2
or by judicial decisions declared in the courts.
†
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1
Indeed some is uniquely personal. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of
Marriage” Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages,
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 699 (2004).
2
See Linda Silberman & Karin Wolfe, The Importance of Private International Law for
Family Issues in an Era of Globalization: Two Case Studies—International Child Abduction
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With respect to the United States as a whole, there is an argument
that the entire question of marriage and divorce regulation should be
subject to a uniform standard, perhaps best achieved at the federal
3
level. Some countries with federal systems do subject marriage and
4
divorce regulation to national treatment. Federal law on these issues
would avoid many of the difficulties that arise when parties marry or
divorce in one state and then move to another. If a national standard
were in place, rights of the marital partners would not be affected by
5
their movement across state lines. Of course, the substance of any
“national” standard could go either way in the debate over same-sex
marriage. One possible interpretation of the present U.S. Constitution could result in preventing states from classifying marriage as a
status reserved for persons of different sexes—that would in effect
mean any state providing for the marital relationship would have to
make it available to couples regardless of their sexual orientation and
6
would establish a single uniform standard. Alternatively, the recently
proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution—which failed to win
the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the House and be submitted
to the states for ratification—would have restricted marriage to one
7
man and one woman. Such an amendment also creates a national
standard on marriage, but would prevent all same-sex marriages.

and Same-Sex Unions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 247-48 (2003) [hereinafter Private International Law for Family Issues].
3
Such uniformity could be achieved through federal legislation and, to a lesser
degree, through uniform state laws. There was thought at one time that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to justify federal law on the subject. See James
Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 918 & n.249, 919 (2000) (discussing
the interest in federally enforced uniformity for divorce laws in the early twentieth century). For an interesting historical account of the movement for uniform divorce legislation, see James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2106-28 (1991).
4
For example, in Germany family law is within the realm of federal law and regulation by the states is preempted. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 72, 74; §§ 1297-1921
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]. In Australia, federal legislation—the Family Law
Act of 1975, the Family Law Reform Act of 1995, and subsequent amendments—
governs family law matters.
5
Issues of recognition of such relationships would still arise if the parties move
across national boundaries.
6
The analogy is to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), which held state laws prohibiting interracial marriages to be unconstitutional.
7
See Helen Dewar, House Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2004,
at A27, available at 2004 WL 93180301 (discussing the vote and opponents’ criticisms).
The possibility of re-introducing an amendment remains, and President Bush has announced his support for such an amendment. See Richard W. Stevenson, White House
Again Backs Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A15, available at 2005
WLNR 620844 (detailing comments made by President Bush during interviews show-
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Pluralism in the United States has always made national consensus
on a variety of family matters difficult. Long before the issue of samesex marriage came to the fore, similar conflict-of-laws issues arose with
respect to interracial marriages and the application of miscegenation
8
statutes, as well as over grounds for divorce and the ability to obtain
9
migratory divorces. Historically, issues of family law—marriage, divorce, and custody—have generally been left to the states to establish
10
according to their own community norms. Accordingly, the present
landscape allows each state in the United States to make the choice
about same-sex marriage (and civil unions and registered domestic
11
partnerships, for that matter) for itself. But because parties in marital relationships often act outside their community or move elsewhere
and establish a new home base, other states must address the rights
and obligations of the parties to a union that they may have prevented
12
altogether. This Essay offers a normative analysis for these conflictof-laws issues in a fashion that I believe best reflects the needs and values of our federal system, giving genuine respect to the decision made
in a relevant community about the desirability of permitting same-sex
marriages.

ing his continued support for a ban).
8
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996).
9
See generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).
10
The reasons are explored in Ann C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1787 (1995). See also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 295-96
(1985).
11
For an examination of the question of how and by whom the issue of same-sex
marriage should be resolved in the United States, see Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides
and What Difference Does It Make?: Defining Marriage in “Our Democratic, Federal Republic,”
18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273 (2004).
12
There has been extensive commentary on the subject. For a representative sampling, see Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional
Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998); Deborah M.
Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551
(1994); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 921 (1998) [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage]; Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997);
Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?: A Comment on Same-Sex
Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191 (1996) [hereinafter Can the
Island of Hawaii Bind the World?]; Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83 (1998).
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I. THE EVASION SCENARIO
The conflict-of-laws issues arise in a variety of different contexts.
The “easiest” case for me is what I refer to as the “evasion” case. An
evasion case arises in the following way: assume a state in the United
States or elsewhere decides to authorize same-sex marriage—at one
13
time it looked like this state might be Hawaii; now it might be Massa14
15
16
chusetts, New York, California, or possibly one of the Canadian
17
provinces. A same-sex couple from another state that does not permit same-sex marriage—say Pennsylvania—travels to Massachusetts to
get married and then returns home to Pennsylvania. How should one
view the out-of-state marriage? If one brings a modern conflict-of-laws
analysis to bear on this subject, the way to understand the law authorizing same-sex marriage is to view it as a social, moral, and political
judgment that affects members of a particular community—i.e., those
13

The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reh’g
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike,
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), held that Hawaii’s marriage law constituted discrimination
on the basis of sex under the Hawaii Constitution and remanded the case to allow the
State to try to establish a compelling state interest. A subsequent amendment to the
Hawaii Constitution reserved the legislature’s power to limit marriage to couples of the
opposite sex. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. In Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999),
the state constitutional challenge was held to be moot due to the amendment changing the state constitution. See generally David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000).
14
See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003), discussed
infra at pages 2200-01; see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565,
569-71 (Mass. 2004) (advising that a proposed civil union bill would not cure the constitutional infirmity).
15
A recent decision by a New York City trial judge held that New York’s domestic
relations law defining marriage as between a man and a woman violated the New York
Constitution. See Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 4, 2005). But decisions by other courts in New York have rejected similar challenges. See, e.g., Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 2004). An expedited
appeal in the Hernandez case was denied, delaying a ruling by the state’s highest court,
the Court of Appeals. See Sabrina Tavernise, New York Court Refuses Gay Marriage Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at B2.
16
See Marriage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365, 2005
WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (finding that sections 300 and 308.5 of the
California Family Code, defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman,
violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution). Compare Lockyer v. City
& County of S.F., 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004). In Lockyer, the California Supreme Court
voided all marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in contravention of sections 300
and 308.5. The court held that the public officials who issued the licenses exceeded
their ministerial authority when they acted on their belief that the statutes were unconstitutional. The opinion also noted, however, that same-sex marriages would be valid if
the unconstitutionality was judicially determined.
17
See infra note 37.
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individuals who are and will be residing in Massachusetts. When a
couple from Pennsylvania—that is, two Pennsylvanians who live in
Pennsylvania and who will return to live in Pennsylvania—come to get
married in Massachusetts, Massachusetts has little justification for extending its law to them. In conflict-of-laws terminology, Massachusetts
18
has no interest in applying its law to this case. In this situation, there
is not only a question of the recognition of the marriage in Pennsylvania, but also whether the Massachusetts rule about same-sex marriage should or constitutionally even could extend to these individuals. The Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum & Co. v.
19
Shutts suggests that Massachusetts may be constitutionally disabled
from applying its law in such a case since it has no policy justification
for regulating the capacity of these parties to marry. If, however,
same-sex marriage were permitted in the state where the parties were
resident or domiciled—or even possibly if there were no impediment
to such a marriage in that state—Massachusetts might have reason to
extend the “courtesy” of a marriage ceremony to the couple because
to do so would not infringe upon the interest of the other state.
Some might argue that the long history and tradition of the “place
of celebration” rule could be invoked to reject any argument that ap20
plying the law where the marriage takes place is unconstitutional, but
18

Modern conflict-of-laws analysis looks to ascertain a policy or “interest” that is
furthered by the application of a particular law to the facts in the case. “Interests” can
result because of the state’s concern with its residents or domiciliaries or due to its policy of encouraging or discouraging particular activities in the state. However, certain
“interests” would not be legitimate interests, such as a Massachusetts interest in attracting marriages to be conducted in-state so as to foster hotel and catering businesses in
Massachusetts. But see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995) (identifying the
economic advantages for a state in celebrating same-sex marriages for out-of-state couples). Such a parasitic interest that is achieved only from evading the genuine policies
of other states would not qualify as legitimate for purposes of interest analysis. See
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 12, at 942 n.63.
19
472 U.S. 797 (1985). In Shutts, in the context of a nationwide class action, the
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for Kansas to apply its own law to the
claims of class members who were not residents of Kansas and where the transactions
giving rise to their claims had no connection with Kansas. Id. at 814; see also Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (“[F}or a State’s substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”).
20
Justice Scalia has drawn upon history and tradition as a basis for refusing to
overturn traditional choice of law rules, such as the “procedural characterization” of
statutes of limitations, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1988) (“In
sum, long established and still subsisting choice-of-law practices that come to be
thought, by modern scholars, unwise, do not thereby become unconstitutional.”), and
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there have always been exceptions to the place of celebration rule that
mirror similar interests expressed in laws prohibiting same-sex mar21
riages at the state of the parties’ domicile. The lack of a justifiable
“interest” (in conflicts terminology) by the state of celebration in extending its laws to cases of evasion was acknowledged in Goodridge v.
22
Department of Public Health —the recent Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts decision upholding same-sex marriage. In his concurring opinion, in a footnote that initially went unnoticed by some, Justice Greaney explained that the court’s ruling requiring Massachusetts
to license same-sex couples would be limited to Massachusetts resi23
dents; Justice Greaney called attention to two state statutes that affected the impact of the holding. One statute prohibits the marriage
of any party residing and continuing to reside in another jurisdiction,
for upholding potentially outdated jurisdictional rules, see Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding transient presence of the defendant in the forum state
as a basis for jurisdiction).
21
The place of celebration rule, adopted in section 121 of the First Restatement of
Conflicts, also contained this exception for cases where recognition would run afoul of
the domiciliary state’s strong public policy. Section 132 of the First Restatement provided:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party,
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been
complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at
the domicil regarded as odious,
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even
though celebrated in another state.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). In addition, section 129 of
the First Restatement, which adopted the place of celebration rule even where the parties
crossed state lines in order to evade the requirement of the law of their domicile, also
included as an exception the circumstances stated in section 132. Id. § 129. See generally Developments in the Law: Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2028, 2037 (2003) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]
(“Domicile, then, is the paramount ‘interest-creating contact’ between a state and a
marriage.”); Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 952 (1977) (observing that domicile at the time of marriage appears to trigger the
interest in invalidating a marriage on grounds of public policy).
22
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
23
Id. at 972 n.4 (Greaney, J., concurring) (noting that Massachusetts law would
preclude the use of “legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts . . . as a tool to
obtain recognition of a marriage in [another] State that is otherwise unlawful”). I
have discussed the point elsewhere. See Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for
Family Issues, supra note 2, at 268 (“[W]ere same-sex marriage legalized in Massachusetts, the statutes governing the issuance of marriage licenses would preclude couples,
who could not marry in their home jurisdictions, from marrying in Massachusetts.”).
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if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdic24
tion, and declares any such marriage null and void. A second statute
requires the official issuing a marriage license to a nonresident to be
satisfied that the person was “not prohibited from intermarrying by
25
the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides.”
Statutes of this kind reflect a respect by the proposed state of
celebration for the genuine regulatory interests and values of the particular community of which the couple is a member. Interestingly, following the decision in Goodridge, the Attorney General of Massachusetts issued an order to municipal clerks in Massachusetts to refrain
from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples from outside Mas26
sachusetts.
That order was challenged in subsequent litigation,
claiming that this was an impermissible discriminatory enforcement
27
scheme. In rejecting the challenge, a Massachusetts trial court in
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health noted that the instructions
being given to the clerks addressed all marriage impediments—
including impediments based on age, consanguinity or affinity, marital status or same-gender status—of couples who reside and intend to
28
continue to reside in other states. Nor was the court persuaded by
the argument that it was only in the context of same-sex marriages
that Massachusetts began to take interest in the out-of-state evasion
marriages The enforcement in Massachusetts, held the court, was uni29
form and systematic.
Legislation dealing with the evasion of domiciliary marriage laws is
not prevalent in the United States. The Uniform Law Commissioners
30
did propose a Uniform Act on the subject, but it was later withdrawn,

24

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (Law Co-op. 2003).
Id. § 12.
26
See Yvonne Abraham, AG Asks End of Out-Of-State Marriage Licenses, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 22, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WLNR 3566823.
27
See Yvonne Abraham, Two Lawsuits to Challenge 1913 Law, BOSTON GLOBE, June
17, 2004, at B5,available at 2004 WLNR 3603779.
28
See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 042656G, 2004 WL 2075557, at
*10-11 (Mass. Super. Aug. 18, 2004).
29
Id. at *11.
30
See the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, promulgated by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1912. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW,
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 147 (1943). The Act provided “that if any person residing
and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from
contracting marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another state or country
and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state,
such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state.”
25
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31

having been adopted by only a very few states. Nonetheless, a number of states do have some type of marriage-evasion provision in their
32
statutes. And in the marriage laws of many European countries, it is
very common to find provisions to prevent marriages that evade the
33
In some countries the substantive reotherwise appropriate law.
quirements for contracting a marriage are determined for the parties
by the law of their nationalities, or in some cases their habitual residences or domiciles. It is a common requirement that a foreign national or resident present a certificate from the state of origin showing
that there are no impediments to the marriage according to the laws
34
of that state. In the specific context of the few countries that permit
same-sex marriage, Belgium limits them to those situations where such
35
marriages are allowed by the national law of each partner; and the
Netherlands only requires that one of the spouses be a citizen or resi36
dent of the Netherlands, but residency requires formal registration.
37
Several provinces in Canada now permit same-sex marriage but at

31

The Act was withdrawn from the list of recommended Uniform Acts in 1943 after only five states had adopted it. Id. Those states were Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 9 U.L.A. 480 (1942); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 210 cmt. 9A U.L.A. 194 (1998).
32
See Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 12, at 923 n.2 (listing jurisdictions
that have marriage-evasion statutes).
33
See Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for Family Issues, supra note 2, at
249-56.
34
See, e.g., § 1309 BGB (F.R.G.) (requiring foreigners to verify the legality of their
marriage in their state).
35
See Loi ouvrant le mariage à des personnes de même sexe et modifiant certaines
dispositions du Code civil, Wet tot openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van
hetzelfde geslacht en tot wijziging van een aantal bepalingnen van het Burgerlijk Wetboek [Law opening marriage to persons of the same sex and amending certain provisions of the Civil Code], ch. II, art. 7 (Feb. 13, 2003), reprinted in 173 Moniteur Belge,
Belgisch Staatsblad [Stb.] 9825, 9880, available at http://www.notaire.be/info/
mariages/020_mariage_entre_personnes_du_meme_sexe_loi.htm.
36
Wet openstelling huwelijk [Law opening marriage], art. I.E, 2001 Staatsblad van
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 9 (2001), available at http://www.justitie.nl/
pers/persberichten/archief/2000/huwelijk.pdf.
37
The highest courts in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec have held that
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violates the right to equality in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Halpern v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [2003] 65
O.R.3d 161, 196 (concluding that the ban on gay marriage was not “reasonable and
justified in a free and democratic society”); EGALE Can. Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Can.,
[2003] 225 D.L.R.4th 472, 480 (B.C.) (invalidating a common law bar to same-sex marriage); Hendricks c. Québec, [2004] R.J.Q. 851 (Que. C.A.). For a discussion of this
recent Canadian jurisprudence, see Mary Jane Mossman, Conversations About Families in
Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are There “Lessons” for the United States?, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 171, 175-83 (2003).
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present there do not appear to be residency requirements or other restrictions, and thus these Canadian provinces may offer havens for
38
nonresidents to obtain a same-sex marriage.
The fact that a couple has evaded its home state’s laws does not
necessarily mean that the home state must refuse to confer benefits
under its laws to which married persons are entitled. When a couple
has contracted an “evasion marriage” and returned to their home
state, there may still be reasons for that home state to confer certain
benefits of a marriage valid where celebrated—even if the marriage
itself would not be valid in the home state. The classic casebook ex39
ample is In re May’s Estate where the New York Court of Appeals conferred upon the spouse a “probate benefit” even though the marriage
was not permitted under New York law and the parties could be said
to have “evaded” the law of New York. Cases of this type are referred
to as involving an “incidental question” because the validity of the
40
marriage is not the direct object of the suit. Rather, what is at stake
is a particular benefit under the couple’s home state law. At the point
in time when the issue in May’s Estate arose—thirty-five years after the
marriage at issue—the only state with a policy to be furthered was that
of New York. It is only because the New York statute was written in
terms of “spouse” that the validity of the marriage was the issue at all.
The state with the relevant policy in such a situation is New York and
New York should be free to decide what relationship qualifies as a
“spouse” within the meaning of its statute. The parties in May’s Estate
had lived in New York as husband and wife for thirty-five years, and it
was proper for New York to decide that a party to a marriage valid
where celebrated was entitled—after many years of living together as
spouses in New York—to the benefits generally accorded to a spouse.
The decision by a trial court in New York, Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospi41
tal, permitting a same-sex partner to sue under New York’s wrongful

38

Proposed federal legislation authorizing same-sex marriage is presently before
the Canadian Parliament. See Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage for civil purposes, Bill C-38, available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/fs/
ssm/. The bill does not contain any residency requirement or limitations with respect
to nonresidents.
39
114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
40
See A.E. Gotlieb, The Incidental Question Revisited—Theory and Practice in the Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 734, 734 (1977) (defining the “incidental question”
problem). See generally SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.) § 13.3, at 561-62
(2004).
41
765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
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death statute for negligent treatment in a New York hospital, is con43
sistent with this view. At the same time, however, New York should
not be required to confer benefits upon parties who “evaded” New
York marriage law. A New York court could well decide that it should
not encourage evasion of its marriage law, and that this purpose is
best achieved by denying benefits even many years later. The basic
point here is that a proper conflict-of-laws analysis indicates that the
relevant inquiry is for New York—whether through its judges interpreting statutes or the legislature defining the scope of benefits—to
decide whether its law conferring particular benefits extends to these
parties.
II. THE MOBILE MARRIAGE
A similar principle applies to what I will call the “conflict mobile”
situation—that is, a case where the parties are validly married in Massachusetts and only later move to a state that does not permit same-sex
44
marriages. This is not a case where the marriage policies of the state
of residence or domicile are evaded. Unlike the situation of marriage
evasion, the parties in this scenario comply with the only law that is
relevant to their relationship at the time of the marriage. Indeed,
many of the principles on which conflict-of-laws principles are formu-

42

In Langan, the plaintiff and the decedent had entered a civil union in Vermont.
The existence of this “state sanctioned union” was the basis for the court to distinguish
cases in which unmarried persons living together—whether heterosexual or homosexual—were not entitled to benefits under New York wrongful death or probate statutes.
Id. at 416; see also Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for Family Issues, supra
note 2, at 261 n.124 (discussing Langan).
43
In Langan, as in May’s Estate, the justification of New York’s interest is two-fold.
The benefit being conferred is derived from a New York statute and the parties were
domiciled in New York. New York’s interest in providing the benefit might be less—
although still constitutional—if nonresident parties domiciled in a state prohibiting
same-sex marriage or union had been injured in New York and sought recovery under
New York’s wrongful death statute. Alternatively, in such a case, the New York courts
might look to whether the law of the state of the parties’ domicile would recognize the
party as a “spouse.” See infra Part III (discussing these transient effects).
44
Several commentators have referred to this as “migratory marriage.” See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2040-42; Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition
of Same-Sex Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2153-59 (2005)
[hereinafter Interstate Recognition] (defining migratory marriages and explaining the
rights that should and should not attach to such marriages). I use the term “mobile
marriage” rather than “migratory marriage” to avoid confusion with the wellentrenched notion of “migratory divorce,” which really is closer to the evasion situation, even though divorce jurisdiction is predicated on a technical finding of domicile.
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45

lated, such as upholding expectations of the parties and respect for
the legitimate interests of sister states, support recognition of the marriage relationship and the conferral of benefits that usually accompany that relationship. Those rights may include spousal elective
shares, pension benefits, maintenance, property rights, and invocation
of marital privilege.
The factors relied upon to shape choice-of-law principles—
relevant polices of both the forum and of other states, the protection
of justified expectations, and certainty and predictability—suggest that
the applicable choice-of-law rule in these validity-of-marriage cases
should be the law of the state where the parties were domiciled at the time of
46
the marriage. Analogies can be found in various conflict-of-laws rules
applicable to the marriage relationship. Section 283(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that “[t]he validity of a
marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to
47
the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.”
And the presumptive reference to the applicable law in subsection (2)

45

The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the following factors as relevant to
the choice of the applicable rule of law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
46
Both I and others have urged this rule in other writing. See Silberman, Can the
Island of Hawaii Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 203-04; see also SCOLES ET AL., supra
note 40, § 13.8, at 572 (“As the continuing marriage relationship is undertaken and expectations develop, the state most significantly concerned and related would seem to
be the intended family domicile of the parties, in a mobile society, at the time it
arises.”); Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 341 (1998) (identifying the state of
domicile at the time of marriage as the state with the most significant interest in the
validity of same-sex marriages).
I use the term “domicile at the time of the marriage” to mean where the parties
are resident or domiciled immediately before and immediately after the marriage.
More complex scenarios could involve parties who leave their residence/domicile to
marry and then to reside in the marriage-celebration state or parties who live in different states before their marriage and perhaps even after the marriage. For purposes of
the analysis here, I am using only the “paradigm” case. I also am not focusing on distinctions between “residency” and “domicile.”
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971).
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of section 283 is the law “where the marriage was contracted . . . unless
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
48
the marriage.” Comment j to section 283 observes that such policies
are likely to be those of a state “where at least one of the spouses was
domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both made their
49
As regards the “incidents” of the
home immediately thereafter.”
marriage, section 284 of the Restatement (Second) refers back to the
50
provisions of section 283. Other provisions of the Second Restatement
adopt a similar rule. In determining the property rights of spouses in
movables acquired during the marriage, section 258 of the Restatement (Second) points to the law of the state where the spouses were domi51
ciled at the time of the marriage.
Although I urge adoption of a conflict-of-laws rule that would determine the validity of a marriage under the law where the spouses
52
were domiciled at the time of the marriage, I do not believe such a
rule is constitutionally compelled. A second state to which the couple
moves does have a relevant interest in conferring particular benefits
under its own law and can, after measuring its interest as compared to
that of the other state, determine whether it is willing to confer the
particular benefit. Its own policy against same-sex marriage may be
such that it chooses not to privilege the relationship with any economic benefits, or it may decide that it only wants to withhold specific
attributes, for example, the right to adopt.53 The interests of a state in
bestowing or not bestowing the incidents of marriage are also acknowledged by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws; comment c
to section 284 relating to “incidents of foreign marriage” observes that
a “state will not give a particular incident to a foreign marriage when
54
to do so would be contrary to its strong local policy.” Of course, the
ability of a state to confer or withhold benefits is constitutional only so

48

Id. § 283(2).
Id. cmt. j.
50
Section 284, entitled “Incidents of Foreign Marriage,” provides: “A state usually
gives the same incidents to a foreign marriage, which is valid under the principles
stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage contracted within its territory.” Id. § 284.
51
See id. § 258.
52
See Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 203-04.
53
See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827
(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Florida statute prohibiting the adoption of minors by
homosexual persons was not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284 cmt. c (1971).
49
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long as sexual preference has not become a constitutionally protected
55
class for these purposes.

55

In this Essay I do not address at all the constitutional reverberations emanating
from Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the United States Supreme Court decision
holding that a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy between same-sex parties violates
the Fourteenth Amendment. But on the questions of whether same-sex marriage is
constitutionally compelled under federal due process and equal protection standards,
I have long thought that there is a difference with respect to whether a state should be
required to put its “imprimatur” on the relationship by conferring the special and
symbolic status of marriage and whether it should have to confer equal economic
rights upon the parties. That is, a state might be permitted to withhold its “imprimatur” so long as it allowed couples an available alternative that provided them with similar economic benefits. Such an analysis appears to underlie the legislative action in
Hawaii and Vermont to provide for reciprocal benefit statutes (Hawaii) or civil unions
(Vermont). See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2001). In Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), the Vermont Supreme Court, interpreting the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, held that same-sex
couples were entitled to a right to marriage or its equivalent. Id. at 867.
During one colloquy at the Penn symposium, I was queried about whether the
constitutional rights of a child might be infringed if a state to which its parents move is
permitted to determine for itself what benefits or rights to confer regarding the parents’ relationship. In most situations, the right to a child’s relationship with a parent
or a right to support from a parent is independent of the marital status of the parents.
Whether sexual orientation is a factor that can be taken into account in determining
custody is a different question, compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding
that consideration of race with respect to determination of custody is unconstitutional), but that issue is also separate from the marital status of a same-sex couple. The
situation could arise, however, if a state does tie custody to marital status. One example is a custody or visitation order that results from the presumptive rule adopted in
many states that when a child is born to a married couple, both of those parties are legal parents. If a nonbiological “parent” in a same-sex union would not be entitled to
custody or visitation but for this presumption, it could be said that such a right of custody or visitation is a “right or claim arising from” a “relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage.” Under the Defense of Marriage Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2004), such a judgment would not have to be recognized by a sister
state, even if it otherwise would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, or one of the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Acts in effect in all the states.
In one recent case, a same-sex couple residing in Virginia entered into a civil union in Vermont but continued to reside in Virginia for over a year. One of the partners subsequently gave birth to a daughter in Virginia. Three months after the girl’s
birth, the couple and child moved to Vermont, where they lived for over a year. When
the relationship ended, the biological mother returned to Virginia with the child. In a
proceeding to dissolve the civil union, a Vermont court, relying on the presumption
that both parties of a marriage are legal parents of any child born during the marriage,
and equating same-sex union with marriage under Vermont law, recognized a parental
interest in both women, and awarded the nonbiological parent visitation. See MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 (Rutland, Vt. Fam. Ct. June 17, 2004). While
those proceedings were pending, the biological mother initiated a custody proceeding
in Virginia, requesting to be named the only legal parent and awarded sole custody.
The Virginia court awarded her full custody and held that Virginia law recognized nei-
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Several conceptual frameworks in conflict of laws support a state’s
choice to assert its own policies against same-sex marriage at the expense of the interests of the state that permitted such marriage, even
when that state was the domicile at the time of marriage. The state
whose benefit is now at issue can be said to be furthering its own policy over that of a sister state—a common phenomenon in choice of
law analysis. Alternatively, a state has been free to refuse to recognize
the validity or incidents of a marriage where such recognition is mani56
festly incompatible with its public policy.
III. TRANSIENT EFFECTS
A variation on the above scenario involves the situation where the
parties marry and continue to reside in a state which allows same-sex
marriage. Nonetheless, the interstate activities of the parties may result in the implication of another state’s law. For example, an accident in another state might result in the application of that state’s
wrongful death statute, and the question would be whether the samesex partner qualified as a “spouse” for purposes of that statute. Or the
parties may try to avail themselves of a particular benefit, for example,
a “spousal” voucher, or the right to exercise decision-making power in
the event one partner is disabled. Depending upon the particular
right or benefit in question, the state with such a limited nexus to the
parties has little interest in what the formal relationship of the couple
is. As in the scenario of the “mobile marriage,” the forum state should
look to the laws of the couple’s state of domicile to determine their
status, and if the state of domicile would regard the couple as mar57
ried, it should accord the rights and benefits to the couple that it

ther same-sex unions nor rights arising therefrom. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, CH
04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004). Vermont has since held the biological mother in contempt
and both cases are being appealed.
56
See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (finding that
the plaintiff was not entitled to a “widow’s allowance” as surviving spouse to her uncle
(the decedent) because the marriage, though valid in Italy where the parties were living when they were married, contravened the public policy of Connecticut). Compare
In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. App. 1948), where two wives of a California decedent were permitted to share in the distribution of his estate. The two marriages had legally taken place in Punjab Province, British India, but the decedent had
emigrated to California, where he died. The California court observed that public policy considerations would seem to apply “only if [the] decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California” and not where “only the question of descent of
property [was] involved.” Id. at 502.
57
That status might result from application of the domiciliary state’s own internal
rule or its recognition of the marriage under choice of law principles. In effect, a ref-
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would to its own domiciliaries. But unlike the situation of the mobile
marriage, where the new state of domicile could be said to have a significant interest in whether or not to confer benefits to couples who
have come into the state after being domiciled elsewhere, in this case
the forum state has only a transient connection with the parties and
much less of an interest in furthering its own policies with respect to
the incentives that conferring or withholding benefits may have upon
the couple’s formal relationship. Nonetheless, as a constitutional
matter, a state that has a significant enough connection to justify application of its own law would probably have the power to determine
58
the reach of benefits conferred by its own laws.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
I turn now to the question of public policy and the effect of the
state Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) as an expression of a state’s
59
public policy. In cases where the issue is whether a state will confer a
particular benefit—whether it be a pension right, a right to recover
under a wrongful death statute, or a probate right—reading too much
into a mini-DOMA may be a mistake. A prohibition on same-sex marriage—even one expressed in legislation—does not necessarily mean
that all economic benefits should be denied. Interestingly, polls have
shown that while a substantial majority of the public rejects the idea of
60
same-sex marriage, a narrow majority also believes that same-sex
couples should receive equal treatment with respect to economic
61
rights. That societal judgment may play out in different ways when it

erence to the law of the domicile here might include adoption of a renvoi.
58
In some situations, that might mean denying benefits even where the couple is
treated as married by the state of domicile. In other situations, a state might confer a
benefit on a couple because its policy is to honor formal unions even if the state of the
parties’ domicile would not. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
59
The Defense of Marriage Acts enacted by a large number of states prohibit
same-sex couples from marrying within the state and provide that the state will refuse
to recognize marriages between two people of the same sex performed in other states.
For a catalogue of the various DOMAs, see American Bar Association Section of Family
Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and
Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 397-402 (2004).
60
See, e.g., CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (Mar. 18-20, 2005) (showing that 68% of
poll respondents thought that same-sex marriages should not be recognized), available
at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm; Pew Research Center/Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Survey (Aug. 5-10, 2004) (60%), available at http://
www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm; Quinnipiac University Poll (Dec. 7-12, 2004) (65%),
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
61
A majority responded favorably to the question whether same-sex couples
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comes to determining whether same-sex couples may obtain rights
and benefits under state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage. In
states that prohibit same-sex marriage but offer civil unions, there
should be little difference as to whether a party has a right to the particular benefit as a “domestic partner” or as a spouse. However, if
there are differences in the scope of those benefits, the more appropriate regime may be that of the domestic partnership. For example,
in Germany, the conflict-of-laws rules provide that same-sex partnerships registered outside of Germany will not be given any greater
benefits than those given under the German registered domestic
62
partnership law and the German Civil Code.
On the other hand, in some states where there are mini-DOMAs,
domestic partnership benefits are not offered at all. In such cases, a
mini-DOMA may be construed to reflect a policy against recognition
of any rights or economic benefits flowing from the relationship.
Some state DOMAs are even more explicit. For example, Nebraska
enacted a constitutional provision that rejects marriage, domestic
partnerships, civil unions, or other same-sex relationships, and states
63
that “they shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.” The Kentucky statute not only states that a marriage between members of the
64
same sex is against Kentucky public policy but a specific provision
also voids out-of-state same-sex marriages and provides that any rights
granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termination, shall be unen65
forceable in Kentucky courts. No federal constitutional full faith and
credit challenge is availing either—even with respect to a sister-state
66
judgment—since the federal Defense of Marriage Act frees states
from any constitutional obligation of judgment recognition. Marriages, of course, have always fallen within the “full faith and credit to

should be allowed to form civil unions with the same legal rights as opposite-sex married couples. See, e.g., CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (March 5-7, 2004) (showing
54%), available at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil2.htm; Pew Research Center/Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Survey (Aug. 5-10, 2004) (48%), available
at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
62
See art. 17b (4) BGB (F.R.G.).
63
NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (2000).
64
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1998)
65
Id. § 402.045.
66
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). One provision of that Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C, provides that no state is required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state “respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . .
or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”
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laws” standard and have always been subject to a comparison of inter67
ests and/or public policy.
Professor Tobias Wolff’s paper in this Symposium attempts to nuance the reasons that a particular state might refuse to recognize a
marriage or confer benefits on a same-sex marriage entered elsewhere, and he argues that some of those reasons might violate consti68
tutional norms. For example, he posits that one reason a state may
refuse to recognize same-sex marriage is to dissuade couples from migrating to that state because it does not want same-sex couples residing there. That reason, Professor Wolff contends, is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for refusing to recognize same-sex marriage.
Professor Wolff is probably correct about the unconstitutionality of
such a purpose, assuming that a state would concede that this were its
purpose. But that does not advance the inquiry very far because telling a state that it cannot prevent same-sex couples from taking up
residence there is far different from requiring that state to confer
benefits under its laws with respect to relationships that it chooses not
to privilege. There is a U.S. Supreme Court divorce case that comes
69
to mind in this respect—Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank —
where Florida was permitted to affect the rights of a New York “wife”
who was never served with process in an ex parte divorce proceeding
in Florida, at least in regard to dower rights conferred by Florida law.
The Supreme Court held that the Florida decree could not cut off
economic rights of the wife under New York law but the Florida decree could affect rights under Florida law by defining for itself who
70
was a widow. In addition, it should be kept in mind that a state that
refuses to confer benefits on these “new” domiciliaries is treating
them in the same way that it treats its long-term domiciliaries.
Professor Andrew Koppelman proposes a different approach that
a state might take in determining whether the conferral of a particular
incident of marriage is consistent with its public policy. He argues
that if the parties can contract about such a benefit, then the forum
“cannot coherently be said to have a public policy against them enjoy-

67

For a fuller discussion of this point, see Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind
the World?, supra note 12, at 193-96 (discussing, inter alia, the difference between laws
and judgments in the context of full faith and credit).
68
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2218-40 (2005).
69
381 U.S. 81 (1965).
70
Id. at 85-86.
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71

ing that incident.” Thus, he suggests that since parties can contract
about inheritance rights or about making medical decisions about
one’s partner, conferring such rights cannot be said to violate a state’s
public policy. But Professor Koppelman’s analysis really begs the
question. If the parties do contract about such rights, a state may have
no basis other than the sexual behavior of the parties to invalidate
those contractual rights, and that might well violate the basic principle
of Lawrence. But in the absence of a contract, the parties are relying
upon the state to create their rights, and it is the state’s prerogative
whether to do so and what relationships it chooses to “privilege.” Indeed, some state Defense of Marriage Acts expressly make contractual
72
rights arising from marriage unenforceable in their courts.
I do, however, agree with both Professors Koppelman and Wolff
that with greater sensitivity to the genuine concerns of conflict of laws
a better accommodation of competing state policies would result.
Even in a totally domestic case, states have drawn distinctions as to
when and under what circumstances the validity of a marriage can be
challenged, having to do not only with the strength of the particular
marriage regulation in question but also with values of reliance, ex73
pectations, and good faith. A refined choice of law analysis can do as
much.

71

See Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 44, at 2158.
The Georgia statute provides:
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union
only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the
same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights
granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this
state and the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under
any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to
such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’ respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996).
73
Courts and legislatures have used various doctrines—common-law marriage,
putative spouse, and even estoppel—to confer benefits on couples whose marriage was
invalid. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 242-44 (2d. ed. 2002).
72
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V. “LEGISLATING” CONFLICTS ISSUES
The conflict-of-laws/private international law issues surrounding
same-sex marriage are complex, and the differences in state laws are
likely to result in inconsistency in the recognition of the rights of
same-sex couples as they move about the United States and elsewhere.
Indeed, concerns over the lack of comity have been urged as a justifi74
cation for prohibiting same-sex marriages altogether. However, balanced choice-of-law rules that reflect the competing interests of the
relevant states can be incorporated into same-sex marriage and civil
union provisions so that the relevant communities’ views on these
questions are respected. A number of possibilities present themselves.
Legislation in states that favor same-sex marriage or civil unions is desirable because such legislation offers an opportunity to designate that
its policies on marriage are directed solely to its residents and domiciliaries and thus respect the interests of other states. In line with the
discussion earlier, states should limit the application of their same-sex
marriage or civil union laws to members of their own community—
either through a residency requirement or by restricting application
of the law to persons who do not face an impediment to such a marriage under the laws of the jurisdictions where they reside or intend to
reside. This approach has met with success in many European coun75
tries.
Addressing issues of same-sex marriage and/or civil unions
through legislation gives states that want to authorize such marriages
or unions a means to ensure there will be a forum for dissolution of
such unions if the couple later leaves the state. Sister states that refuse
to formalize same-sex relationships may refuse to provide a forum for
dissolution of a same-sex marriage or union contracted elsewhere, and
76
in those circumstances the parties will be left in limbo. This was pre77
cisely the situation in Rosengarten v. Downes, where parties who were
not residents of Vermont contracted a civil union in Vermont. When
one party tried to dissolve the union in Connecticut, his state of resi-

74

The argument was rejected in a recent trial court decision in New York, which
held that New York’s Domestic Relation Law, which denies marriage licenses and access to civil marriage to same-sex couples, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the New York State Constitution. Hernandez v. Robles, No.
103434/2004, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005).
75
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
76
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996); see also Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 KING’S C. L.J. 63 (2004).
77
802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002)
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dence, the Connecticut court observed that since Connecticut “does
not recognize the validity of such a union . . . there is no res to address
78
and dissolve.” I note that if my own proposal were adopted, Vermont
would have lacked prescriptive authority to grant civil unions to nonresidents in a case like Rosengarten. Nonetheless, the problem could
still arise in the “mobile marriage” scenario—for example, a Vermont
couple who entered into a civil union but later moved to another
state. Under my proposed rule, the new state of residence should apply the marriage law of the state of residence/domicile of the parties
at the time of the marriage, recognizing that a valid marriage had occurred and accordingly providing a forum for divorce. But because a
state that prohibits same-sex marriage will not necessarily adopt that
proposed solution, the state that performed the same-sex marriage or
civil union should also provide for a dissolution remedy in its statutory
scheme.
As for states asked to “recognize” for various purposes a samesex relationship entered into elsewhere, the appropriate choice of law
rule for determining the rights and obligations of same-sex couples
should also be the law of domicile or residence of the parties at the
time of the marriage. Such a rule gives deference to the policies of
the state that has the most significant connection to the parties, and is
consistent with predictability and party expectations. States with “defense of marriage” acts should not further their own policies at the
expense of the legitimate interests of other states and the reasonable
expectations of the parties. While they may have the constitutional
power to do so, states that choose to prohibit same-sex marriage
should not undermine the rights of newly-arriving couples from established marriages in other states that bestowed marital status upon
their residents and domiciliaries. In return, states that decide to favor
same-sex unions should not try to become the “Nevadas” of same-sex
79
marriage.

78

Id. at 175.
I have made this point in other writing. See Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii
Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 208.
79

